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INTRODUCTION
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many
North American cities transitioned from a
patronage-driven governance system dominated
by machine politics to a reform system which
centralized administrative power in a civil service.
Following this period, the Postreform era of
planning in New York City heralded a shift from the
“ethical and administrative superiority” of
centralized planning towards an emphasis on
communicative rationality (Pecorella, 1994:58).
This shift in values was encoded in the New York
City charter reforms of 1975 and 1989 and
resulted in the creation of the modern community
board (CB) system as a means by which to
encourage […] the planning of community life
within the city, the participation of citizens in
city government within their communities, and
the efficient and effective organization of
agencies that deliver municipal services in
local communities (N.Y.C. Charter, Ch. 69 §
2700).
However, despite the promise of CBs and other
modes of community engagement as the vehicles
of local democratic governance and deliberative
decision-making, “as with any progressive force,
procedures developed with a progressive
democratic intention may be subverted for other
purposes” (Healey, 1992). In the cases of two
high-profile planning decisions in the South
Bronx— the economic development deal which
resulted in FreshDirect moving their headquarters
to a site in Port Morris and the Sheridan
Expressway redesign— the degree and kind of
community input was managed in ways that
nullified voices opposed to the projects, which
were ultimately touted by political leaders as wins
for the community (New York State Governor’s
Press Office, 2012; 2017). Activists took different
approaches to overcome these barriers in each
case, and in each case they were largely
unsuccessful. In this research, I investigate the
interplay between the strategies of activists, the
agendas of political leaders, and the governance
landscape on which these conflicts are decided.
Chapter 1 deals with the origins of the
participatory planning process in New York City as
found in the historical record and culminating in
the 1975 Charter Reform. I will narrate the goals of
those agitating for the reform, as well as how
planning was understood by the Goodman
Commission (1972-1975) and the formal
mechanisms they codified in order to improve it. In
Chapter 2 I will conduct a survey of the research
and criticism that has been directed at the
Community Board System, laying the groundwork
for an analysis of case studies in Chapter 3. I will
conclude by developing a theory of co-optation
that instrumentalizes participation in the service of
laundering state power to private interests,
drawing on the case study examples and a
broader literature review.
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METHODOLOGY
In order to explore the topic of participatory
planning I conduct a multifaceted literature review
supported by semi-structured interviews of
activists, journalists and experts. My literature
review includes an investigation into the historical
origins of the participatory planning process in
New York manifested primarily in the Community
Board system, with a focus on contemporary
documents from that era. I have chosen this
approach not only to understand how the
reformers understood their project, but also to
inspect the mode of analysis they deployed to
reach such an understanding, exploring how these
processes developed over time. Following this, I
critically engage with the academic body of
research regarding participation, which can be
organized into a priori theoretical work on
participation and a posteriori analyses of New
York’s participatory governance as implemented.
While analyses of the CB system are situated in
chronological proximity to the historic charter
revisions and thus not per se reflective of the
contemporary functioning of New York’s planning
apparatus, they are valuable as a window into its
genealogy and development. Finally, I construct
the framework of my case studies by collating
newspaper articles and blog posts concerning
their development chronologically in order to build
a narrative, drawing in academic literature to
provide additional context where needed. I have
supported and verified details of this narrative
through semi-structured interviews with
individuals knowledgeable of the project’s
development. As a whole, this approach places
reform in its historical context in order to
understand how the planning process developed,
so that when drawing conclusions about its
contemporary performance the oversights and
assumptions of the past may be avoided or
corrected, with an eye toward the reforms of the
future.
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01: THE ORIGINS OF COMMUNITY
CONTROL IN NEW YORK CITY
PLANNING
Direct community engagement in planning matters
did not arise until the 1963 NYC Charter Reform
with the first Community Planning Councils
(Rauscher & Momtaz, 2014). Before that time,
planning institutions were not exposed to
democratic accountability, although this did not
mean they were free from oversight. While this
isolation was by design, the course of the early to
mid-20th century saw a gradual transition from a
conception of planning as a professional
enterprise isolated from political influence to one
whose allegiance was more muddled. This lack of
clarity in planning governance was a principle
antecedent to the 1975 Charter Reform, which was
responsible for the first codification of what we
know today as the Community Board system. The
Goodman Commission reckoned with planning’s
legitimacy and efficacy, apprehending the
influences on and power dynamics within planning
practice. Their analysis laid the groundwork for the
1975 Charter Reform, which was the first
substantive revision in planning governance since
the 1930s.
This chapter delivers an abbreviated history of the
period leading up to the 1975 reform to set the
stage for the philosophical and theoretical
underpinnings of one of its primary aims:
decentralization. I begin by situating the political
context of the 1975 charter reform under the
auspices of a preceding charter reform in 1938. In
the 37 years following the 1938 reform, a diverse
coalition of community groups and academics
began to foment for a reorganization and
redistribution of planning power, known as
decentralization, of NYC’s planning processes, in
response to the growing opacity and
capriciousness of the cities’ centralized planning
regime. Punctuated by historical events, this
growing chorus led to the introspective exercise of
the Goodman Commission, which analyzed the
existing framework of NYC planning governance
and weighed the different ways that power could
be decentralized and made more accountable to
New Yorkers. As an understanding of the breadth
of what reformers considered the complete
landscape of possible reforms is developed,
competing theories of governance begin to
emerge, culminating in a narrative of the final
ratification of the ecosystem of Community
Boards and land use review we know today.
The framework of the NYC planning regime that
reformers were tasked with evaluating was first
encoded in 1938 by the Thatcher Commission
(Goodman et al., 1973). The Thatcher Commission
came about as the product of wealthy elites
attempting to move city governance away from
machine politics through the imposition of
“socially progressive and elitist values” (Pecorella,
1994:30), a movement which later became known
as the Reform period of NYC politics. The
commission, influenced by a modernist vision of a
centralized, rational, and apolitical bureaucracy
“was...motivated by considerations of
independence, technical expertise, and public
interpretation” (Goodman et al., 1973:10). The
main products of their work was the City Planning
Commission (CPC), a board that would make
decisions about the Zoning Resolution, and a
professional staff for the commission in the
Department of City Planning (DCP), both encoded
in the 1938 reform. It is in reaction to this
governance arrangement that the Postreform
movement arose.
The historical roots of citizen participation in
planning did not emerge from a singular set of
circumstances, nor were the conditions that led to
reform cultivated by one singular entity or class of
entities. Instead, “productive movement did not
happen in linear, predetermined fashion; rather,
moments of conjunction, confluence, and
opportunity better describe the drive’s
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development” (Reaven, 2009:351). There is
agreement among scholars that by and large, the
discontent which culminated in opposition to the
centralized administration of planning in NYC took
place as a product of the civil rights movement
and opposition to urban renewal (Marcuse, 1987).
Additionally, federal programs of the 1960s such
as Model Cities and Community Action stipulated
that community input was required before funds
would be disbursed, giving community
organizations a legitimacy that was moderated by
their largely advisory role (Pecorella, 1994).
Reaven (2009) places the origins of the
participatory planning movement in the 1940s and
50s, emerging from ad hoc networks of volunteers,
academics and professionals constituting an
“engaged public.” For communities of color,
community control meant self-determination
regarding development in their neighborhoods,
such as the ability to reject urban renewal projects,
but white communities adapted the phrase to their
own ends:
[Community control] became the goal of Black
Power, then Brown Power, and then, in a rapid
cooptation of strategies, of White Power in
reasserted form. Community came to be
understood not just as a site for the exercise
of citizenship (as the civic groups had more or
less imagined), but also as the subject of the
exercise itself (Reaven, 2009: 346).
While these campaigns were not equally valid and
in some cases sought mutually exclusive ends,
both sought the end of centralized planning power
to achieve them. Despite the broad base for
reform, it was not until Mayor Lindsay (1966-1973)
recognized a political opportunity in the
decentralization movement to disempower his
political enemies that it gained real purchase in
city hall, eventually resulting in the Office of
Neighborhood Governance, a sort of pilot program
for the CBs. Although the movement became
mainstream out of political expediency rather than
earnest concern, the “fruits of [the reformer’s] work
had gained public legitimacy by the time Lindsay
sought to use them, and should be understood as
civic innovations that emerged from a vital period
of social learning” (Reaven, 2009:341). By the
1970s, the rationale for planning’s independence
began to be questioned at the institutional level
(Goodman et al., 1973).
THE REFORM REGIME STARTS TO CRACK
By the early 1970s planning in NYC had evolved
into multiple agencies with overlapping roles,
which could broadly be divided into a
democratically accountable overhead structure
responsible for oversight, an internal structure that
was meant to add flexibility to planning’s more
systematic functions, and line agencies which
dealt with the more granular and operational
aspects of planning, such as the New York City
Transit Authority. These three categories were the
primary objects of study for the successor to the
Thatcher Commission, the Goodman Commission.
While the city planning regime was meant to be
largely independent from the winds of politics,
limited political oversight did exist through several
mechanisms: the Mayor’s powers to appoint the
CPC membership, the ability of the Board of
Estimate (BOE)1 to override zoning changes, and
the need for approval from both the CPC and BOE
for certain projects such as public housing. This
arrangement was centralized and immune from
political influence by design - but this immunity
also enabled the rise of questionable city agency
appointments, no-bid construction contracts and
preferential financing practices which coagulated
into a corrupt system of graft (Caro, 1974).
Over time the mechanisms in the 1938 charter
began to deviate from their intended purposes, its
vulnerability to corruption being a prime example.
Another example reveals more formal flaws in the
‘38 charter: while the City Planning Commission
was originally insulated from political influence,
1 The Board of Estimate was found unconstitutional in 1989; its
functions were distributed largely to City Council.
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the Chairperson of the CPC had become a role that
served at the Mayor’s pleasure, rather than only
being vulnerable to removal for cause. Since in
official terms the Department of City Planning
served under the Chairperson specifically, this
change meant that the department and its leader
effectively comprised a Mayoral agency. The other
Commission members, should they dissent from
the Chairperson’s wishes, lacked access to
Department staff, therefore preventing studied
consideration of alternative policies (Goodman et
al., 1973).
This politicization, while not per se negative,
contributed to the muddled perception of the
Department’s independence. A more obviously
dysfunctional aspect of the 1938 regime was its
requirement that the DCP develop a master plan,
which had been accomplished in 1969 but was
ultimately not accepted by the CPC. This inability
to instigate a master plan was characteristic of a
flaw with Reform governance, namely that the CPC
lacked enough unilateral capacity to generate
overarching plans that had a credible shot at
implementation. An example of this phenomenon
were the annual and ineffectual Draft Capital
Improvement Plans.
The Plans were supposed to set public
development priorities, and were the product of
considerable interfacing with many different line
agencies. This multi-stakeholder approach
conferred legitimacy in theory, but it was
undermined by the fact that neither the executive
or legislative branches of city government had
anything to do with its production, making it “a
mere process which may happen to commit
development on an episodic basis” (1973:63).
Other constraints further eroded trust in an
independent planning regime, many of which
remain today. The geographic situation of NYC in a
tri-state metropolitan region, combined with
subordination to a state and federal government
for which the travails of local planning are
incidental severely limits the efficacy of planning
activity. This leads to unclear jurisdictional
boundaries, lack of coordination between
agencies, and misapprehension of planning
activity by the public which damages the limited
public trust granted to DCP (Ibid.). The
combination of arcane lines of accountability, the
production of plans with tenuous connections to
reality, and the inscrutable activity of other levels
of government led the Commission to conclude
that “there is deep concern that the structure of
municipal government has become so complex
that its political representatives can no longer be
held accountable” (1973:89).
THE GOODMAN COMMISSION’S ANALYSIS
The fundamental question before reformers in
1973 was “whether the conditions which led to the
creation of an "Independent" City Planning
Commission in 1936 still prevail or whether
circumstances no longer require a professional
semi-autonomous planning entity with city-wide
perspective” (Goodman et al., 1973: 14). Their
approach was to establish five (5) “threshold
planning issues” by which to evaluate different
structural options. These issues were constituted
as linear dualisms between two contradictory
value propositions. Among them were:
1. Planning’s independence as a professional
civil service immune from substantial
public influence and cyclical political
pressure versus it’s politicization as a
publicly accountable agent of the will of
everyday New Yorkers
2. Planning’s centralization as a top-down,
geographically broad enterprise versus it’s
decentralization with more localized
functions, administrations and purviews
3. A mayoral locus versus legislative locus
for the political influence on planning
functions
4. A fragmented administration of planning
functions with overlapping responsibilities
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at different agencies versus a more
consolidated, efficient system that would
demand less oversight and duplication of
roles
5. An emphasis on the overhead, long term
aspects of planning versus a stress on the
day to day operational sub-agencies
Identifying the grounds upon which the reformers
considered the debate over the future of city
planning is instructive, as many of the issues they
examined in 1973 remain live today. While their
analysis does not center on the community board
system, it fleshes out the context in which CB
reform would take place, as well as the potential
tradeoffs at each level of empowerment.
PROPOSALS FOR THE COMMUNITY BOARDS
The Community Board system we are familiar with
today was only one of many options considered
and debated by reformers, each with different
advantages and trade-offs. The discourse around
them was invigorated by the inclusion of a
prototypical CB system in the 1961 charter
revision known as the Office of Neighborhood
Governance, which delayed enumerating their
powers until 1968, providing a robust terrain for
discourse on their final shape (City Planning
Commission, 1968). Out of this milieu several
creative proposals emerged.
The debates over the final form of the Community
Boards were contentious, and many were not
recorded. What survives are the transcripts taken
from public conferences and the quotes from
newspaper interviews that were the forum in
which the leadership of civic organizations
expressed their ideas. While they are by no means
comprehensive of the debate, they are illustrative
of how the white male elite advocates of reform
were conceptualizing the issues at hand.
Martin Dworkis, an NYU professor, argued that the
purview of the CBs should be limited by a reliance
on their Borough President for citywide planning
information (Reaven, 2009). This emphasis on
connecting CBs to the Borough President’s office
followed from how the predecessors to the CBs,
the Community Planning Councils, already were
functioning at the time: members were nominated
by civic organizations subject to the approval of
the Borough President (Ibid.). Returning to the
threshold planning issues described above, this
stance would position him in favor of devolving
planning power to the borough level but not
further, reflecting a sensibility of moderate
decentralization.
Walter Thabit, another reformer and an advocacy
planner associated with Cooper Square
Committee, saw a more ambitious role for the
boards. His position, prescient of a common
criticism leveled against the CB system today, was
that community boards “should have some degree
of decision-making authority, and—very
definitely—the money, technical assistance, and
staff to effectively and responsibly carry out their
responsibilities” (Reaven, 2009:294). Thalbit would
see the centralized planning office of the early
20th century distributed among the CBs, while still
granting these local offices considerable
independence since they would have in-house
professional staff. On the other hand, Roger Starr,
head of the Citizens Housing and Planning
Council, disagreed. He believed that CBs
composed of citizens would fall to rancor and
divisive factionalism, and would not be able to
credibly administer decentralized planning. He
favored politically accountable CBs (Reaven,
2009).
While this is only a subset of the myriad opinions
of stakeholders, and a socially elite subset at that,
I have included their positions to portray the
plasticity of the urban planning process. There
were as many positions as there were
combinations of stances on threshold planning
issues, and while the system as it exists today
feels as if it were set in stone, it is clear that this
was not always the case.
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ENACTMENT
Concurrent but not concomitant with reform
activity was the fiscal crisis that struck New York
City in 1975. The crisis complicates analysis of the
charter reform in two ways: first, it sapped
attention from the reform effort as city leaders
found themselves lacking the bandwidth to give
thorough feedback to the Charter Revision
Commission (CRC). This led to a flurry of calls for
a delay of the final vote, up to and including the
mayor and charter commissioner publicly
withdrawing their support on the eve of the
election (Smothers, 1975). This almost certainly
had a chilling effect on voter’s approval of reform
measures. The second opacifying effect of the
crisis was its confounding of easy comparison
between planning governance’s efficacy before
and after the reforms. While attempts have been
made to measure the effectiveness of reform, the
fact that the Community Boards, Uniform Land
Use Review Procedure (ULURP) and other
hallmarks of the charter revision came into effect
during a time of turmoil for the city has presented
a significant challenge to analysts. Despite these
obstacles, much has been written about the
results of the charter reform, which is elucidated in
the next chapter.
Ultimately the charter revision was broken down
into 10 questions and put to the ballot; the first 6
appeared with a recommendation for their
approval and the remaining 4 were presented
without comment (Reaven, 2009). Somewhat
predictably, the 6 questions endorsed by the
charter commission were approved, while the 4
that were not were voted down (New York Times,
1975). What resulted was by and large the system
we know today.
OUTCOME
Community Boards, 59 in total, each with
membership half appointed by the local city
councilmember and half by the corresponding
borough president, were given a number of
advisory powers. Among these are the ability to
submit advisory resolutions to the CPC
encouraging the approval or disapproval of land
use decisions during ULURP, review plans from line
agencies concerning their neighborhoods,
generate budget priorities, and review budgets
from the centralized planning agencies. Notably
absent in their organization was Thalbit’s call for
CBs to have dedicated planning staff of their own.
Additionally, CBs were not awarded the ability to
reject outright any development within their
boundaries, “giv[ing] local communities a say in
shaping important land use policies without
granting them veto power over the public welfare”
(State Charter Revision Commission, 1975). This
may be contrasted with other cities such as
Newark, where CBs (or their equivalents) do
possess a measure of veto ability (Borelli, 2021).
The internal development of different committees
on zoning, land use, transit and other issues
occurred organically within each board, although
this development was uneven, as I will show later.
Perhaps the most significant result of the 1975
charter reform was the Uniform Land Use Review
Procedure (ULURP), which organized all land use
decisions into a single proceeding: “establishing
the requisite decision-making stages and
timetable for a host of land use applications”,
attending to the criticisms of “fragmentation,
overlapping oversight, and costly delays” levelled
at the previous procedure (Reaven, 2009:334). The
process required that developers disclose details
about projects to CBs, which were subject to their
approval.
Aside from the annual preparation of budget
priorities, the only additional proactive power
available (though not exclusive) to the CBs
through ULURP was the ability to prepare their own
local plans, colloquially known as 197-a plans.
Much like the rest of the reforms associated with
the CBs, these plans are advisory, not carrying
weight until approved by the CPC. Given that they
require a significant investment of time, expense,
and expertise, and that their approval is not
guaranteed, this proactive form of neighborhood
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planning is rarely pursued (Municipal Arts Society,
1998).
The Community Board system arose as the
product of disparate social movements and
circumstantial political expediency in the midst of
a tumultuous fiscal crisis, but its ultimate shape
was the product of the Goodman Commission. As
New York City's government embarked on the
second half of the decade amid a fiscal crisis that
would usher in a decade of austerity (McClelland &
Magdovitz, 2000), it found itself surrounded by a
constellation of new neighborhood-level
institutions. As public attention rapidly turned to
this crisis, a skeleton crew of academics and
planners were left to determine how these
changes in process effected planning outcomes
on the ground.
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02: THE RESULTS OF REFORM
There is broad consensus that the empowerment
of citizens through the Community Board system
has been limited in absolute terms, and that on a
board-to-board basis is stratified according to a
Community District’s racial and class makeup.
How they influence planning outcomes at the
neighborhood level is the product of two factors:
the amount of leverage the CB is able to bring to
bear on a particular development, and the degree
to which they seriously collect, synthesize and
present the wishes of the community with a
unified voice. This latter aspect is much more
difficult to ascertain than the former, but both are
investigated in this chapter.
Scholarly attention to this topic has varied over the
years, as have the trends in CB activity, limiting the
exactness of conclusions concerning their
functionality. For instance, a subsequent charter
reform in 1989 altered aspects of the planning
process by moving responsibilities previously held
by the Board of Estimate to the City Council,
although the role of CBs was largely unaffected.
Even within a set period of time, different areas of
the city experience different development patterns,
and responses to these patterns vary from CB to
CB. Given these chronological, geographic and
socioeconomic differences, any overarching
determination about the quality of the
participatory planning process is necessarily
vague. Still, some patterns have emerged across
timelines and geographies in a manner consistent
enough to constitute trends in the performance of
the system as a whole.
Having explored the various analyses of CB
performance since their inception in 1975, this
chapter concludes by placing their outcome in
dialogue with the work of predominant planning
theorists to explore the disjoints between theory
and practice as encoded in the NYC charter.
HOW POWERFUL ARE THE COMMUNITY
BOARDS IN PRACTICE?
We begin with a review of the ways Community
Boards effectuate their wishes given their limited
power and geographic scope. The powers granted
to the CBs are universally advisory in nature, but
this does not mean their decisions are completely
inconsequential (Fowler, 1980).
Pecorella (1994) identifies four ways that a CB can
assert its will during the ULURP process. The most
straightforward way is that the CB can reject a
development proposal, and the City Planning
Commission concurs with their choice. In many
cases, however, the CB and CPC do not agree. In
such cases, the CPC overturns a Board’s decision
but attaches riders to their approval that address
some of the reasons for rejection. This practice
demonstrates the way that a board’s rejection of a
development functions more as a strong signal to
the CPC, despite lacking statutory or political
power (Fainstein & Fainstein, 1986). In the
instance of private development a third avenue for
a CB to assert itself appears in its power over the
duration of parts of ULURP “by waiving,
accelerating or slowing down the pace of
proceedings” (Marcuse, 1987:279). CBs can also
extract concessions from a developer as a
condition for approval, whether the amenities in
question are related to the development in
question or not. The success of each of these
strategies is extremely context dependent. For
example, if a developer has a cozy relationship
with the Commission, the power of the CB to
extract favors is diminished and outright rejection
of the development is off the table. Despite this
variation, it is safe to say that on balance the CBs
enjoy slightly more leverage in the ULURP process
than their statutorily advisory role would suggest.
Outside of ULURP the prospects for CB power are
not as rosy. While CBs are provided with
substantial budgetary information from the city
government, CB’s influence on budgetary matters
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is “often perfunctory” due to their lack of legal
powers (Marcuse, 1987). Public hearings are
required as part of City Environmental Quality
Review (CEQR), but these meetings do not use the
CBs as a venue. Additionally, although a “Fair
Share” program was initiated with the 1989
reforms to ensure an equal distribution of Locally
Unwanted Land Uses (LULUs) at the borough level,
the poorer areas of each borough continue to
receive a disproportionate number of such
developments (Pecorella, 1994). While this
program does center distributive equity in decision
making, the process is riddled with loopholes and
low compliance standards, and does not apply to
state or federal facilities, as I will show in the case
study section of this paper (New York City Council,
2017). Moreover, it gives Borough Presidents
substantial leeway in siting decisions- an
arrangement that will reappear in the FreshDirect
case study in chapter 3.
DISPARITIES AMONG COMMUNITY BOARDS
Overall, while some CBs have managed to claw
some leverage from their advisory powers during
ULURP, this practice is highly contingent on
neighborhood characteristics and the
developmental landscape. For instance, in the
course of this research planning professionals
have often emphasized to me the reputation of
Manhattan CB4, representing western Manhattan
from Chelsea to Columbus Circle, which is well
known for effectively negotiating with developers
and extracting concessions (Bass, 2020;
Woodward, 2021). At the time of writing, this CB is
represented by the City Council speaker, and
consists of affluent residential and business
corridors which give it a base of expertise to draw
on in addition to the political power of the speaker.
Contrasted with the CBs representing less
well-to-do neighborhoods it becomes clear that
“board effectiveness is still hostage to
socioeconomic variables…[which] do not lend
themselves to structural redress” (Pecorella,
1994:150). Supporting this claim, Pecorella
conducted a survey of the attitudes of CB
members towards the CB system (n=628).
Although this data presents a snapshot of
perspectives in the early 1990s, he identifies a
pattern that remains relevant today:
Board members who support the city’s
community integration approach are more
likely to seek advice from central-city political
actors, whereas community-control advocates
are more likely to rely on local activists as
sources of advice when making decisions on
land-use and service matters (Pecorella,
1994:189).
This reliance on local activists did not occur in a
vacuum. Analyzing the demographic aspects of
survey respondents, he attributes some of the
“alienation from city government among
African-American activists” to a “history of racism,
economic deprivation, and unfulfilled political
promises,” as well as to the deprioritization of
accountability mechanisms implicit in the city’s
fiscal stabilization measures and austerity
governance, which advanced developmental
priorities while elliding questions of equity (p.
190).
While the fiscal health of the city is always in flux,
the ongoing conditions of racial exclusion and the
disproportionate impact of austerity measures on
communities of color that underwrite this mistrust
have not changed significantly since the 1990s.
Although a similar study has not been conducted
more recently, these findings are congruent with
other forms of evidence from the present day,
which I will discuss in chapter 4.
HOW WELL DO COMMUNITY BOARDS
REPRESENT COMMUNITY INTERESTS?
A Community Board’s capacity to represent
constituencies within a neighborhood is limited
foremost by its distance from a democratic
selection process. This distance is compounded
by the nature of appointed board members and the
low voter participation rates in the municipal
elections which determine borough president and
councilmember (NYC Campaign Finance Board,
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2020). Moreover, community boards may
represent some parts of a community more than
others (Hum, 2010; Einstein et al., 2019; Yoder,
2020).
Sharp (1981) delineates between two kinds of
representation: descriptive representation, which
describes how demographically or experientially
similar a representative is to their constituents,
and substantive representation, which describes
the extent to which a representative supports the
same policies as their constituents. While
acknowledging the importance of the former, the
way that CB members are selected enables the
parties responsible for selection, the local City
Councilmember2 and the Borough President, to
choose members who might reflect the
community in demographic characteristics but not
in policy considerations, as we will see in the case
of FreshDirect in Chapter 3.
Moreover, the determination of board membership
by appointment makes members accountable to
their appointee rather than the community they
represent, to the extent that
where dissidents [are] appointed, the result [is]
either to contribute to their cooptation into the
well-regulated channels of the conventional
political process, or to pit them in unrelenting
internal conflict with other members (Marcuse,
1987: 280-281).
Marcuse goes on to note that Borough Presidents
and Council members view CB appointments not
as an exercise in selecting representative and
engaged members of the public, but as patrons
through which they can build their own
constituencies (Ibid.). Understood in this sense,
Community Boards primarily serve to reinforce the
political power of incumbent elected officials,
rendering their advisory planning function
peripheral.
2 The local councilmember recommends half of the Board
appointees to the Borough President, which are generally
granted.
TELEOLOGIES OF PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE
This perspective on the boards comports with the
research into community participation
summarized in Sharp (1981), which contrasted
findings that participation boosted trust in local
government with results indicating low political
efficacy of participants. In one sense this
improvement in trust may be taken as a silver
lining around the grey raincloud of ineffectual
governance. Supporting this optimistic reading,
Marcuse gives credence to the idea that although
sometimes ineffectual, the presence of the CB
system in the City Charter created a permanent
adversarial space that contributed a new and
persistent forum for public discourse, the value of
which should not be discounted (Reaven, 2009).
A less generous interpretation is also possible.
Referring to Ira Katznelson’s description of a
Lindsay-era decentralization experiment in Inwood
and Washington Heights in his book City Trenches,
Reaven makes a more scathing observation:
Activists who recently had tried to set the
terms of engagement and demand distributive
justice now accepted the terms that were
offered [through the Office of Neighborhood
Government] and contended among each
other for the meager fruits. This allowed the
authorities to defuse the urban crisis and
reestablish traditional power centers without
making fundamental social reforms in issues
such as wages, housing, and health (Reaven,
2009:340).
In this telling the subordination of participatory
planning boards by entrenched political forces
effectively neutralized cries for redistributive
policies, foretelling Marcuse’s criticism of the CBs.
In their analysis of the Office of Neighborhood
Government and the Community Board system
that followed it, Susan and Norman Fainstein are
less emphatic, stating that participatory
governance brought about improvements in the
transmission of information despite being a
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co-optative enterprise overall (Fainstein et. al,
1976).
CONCLUSIONS
Each of these scholars - Sharp, Katznelson,
Fainstien et al, and Marcuse - were
contemporaries to the social movements that
produced the Community Board system.3 They
were also participants in an optimistic moment of
social planning that saw academic planning
programs partner with underserved
neighborhoods, although many such programs
terminated before they wrote their analyses
(Sutton, 2017). Perhaps their proximity to the
subject is the reason one detects notes of
equivocation in each. None acknowledge in their
reflections on the decade and a half following the
1975 Charter Revision that the CBs had not lived
up to the promise of community control, or at the
very least had not lived up to the labor of the
activists and organizers invested in the project.
Certainly none carry the implications of the
cooptation they observe to their logical
conclusion: that the apprehension and defanging
of activist energy which occurs in the CB system
presents a less favorable terrain for effectuating
their goals than the pre-1975 status quo. This
failure to communicate clearly about the structural
shortcomings of the CB system produced a
discursive vulnerability that contributed to the
public misapprehension of the CB system that is
ubiquitous today.
At minimum the community empowerment
element of the Charter reform was a failure even
by its own stated goals:
Encourag[ing] genuine citizen participation in
local City government, ensur[ing] that local
City government is responsive to the needs of
3 Academic interest in the CB system appears to coincide with
charter revisions, and outside of such shifts in policy it does
not garner much attention. Some articles/papers mention CBs
in passing, or include CBs in an analysis of participatory
institutions nationally or internationally, but focus on them
exclusively appears to decline following the ‘75 revision,
reappearing for the ‘89 revision and declining dramatically
following Pecorella’s (1994) quantitative analysis of the CBs.
its citizens, [and achieving] effective local
self-government (NYC Charter Commission,
1973).
It is clear that the 1975 Charter Revision did not
achieve its first goal. Rather, it produced a
simulacrum of representative decision making.
The CBs are democratic neither in design nor
practice. In a situation where a community
member wishes to hold a board member
accountable, her only available tool is to vote
against the board member’s nominee. A board
member’s proximity to her nominee, themselves
running in off-year elections which see 20-50%
less turnout than in federal election years
(Campaign Finance Board, 2020), is so attenuated
as to be invisible to even an engaged citizen. In
practice, this makes a CB a co-appendage of its
councilmember and borough president, with
effectively no avenues of redress available.
Having established that the 1975 Charter Revision
failed to develop a framework for genuine citizen
participation in city government, I now turn to two
case studies of planning projects in the South
Bronx which are illustrative of the failures of the
other two objectives of reform: improving the
responsiveness of city government to its citizens
and enabling community self-government
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03: COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION
IN THE SOUTH BRONX
If any community has a claim as the national face
of urban renewal it is the South Bronx. Few
neighborhoods were so victimized by the
centralized planning process that the 1975 Charter
Revision sought to address as those south of E.
Tremont Avenue. The name evokes images of
Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan stepping out of
limousines to address angry crowds amid a grey
wasteland of bricks and rubble, like astronauts
stepping onto the lunar surface. Perhaps the
archetypal vignette of the destruction of the South
Bronx can be found in the One Mile chapter of The
Power Broker, in which Caro depicts a determined
group of working class mothers and the slow
erosion of their hopes to preserve East Tremont
from the inscrutable hunger of Robert Moses and
his Cross Bronx Expressway (Caro, 1974). The
Cross Bronx, connecting the George Washington
Bridge in the West to Throg’s Neck and Long
Island in the East, was infrastructure constructed
not for the benefit of Bronx residents but "so [Long
Island motorists can] get to the Catskills twenty
minutes faster" (Ibid., p. 870) according to future
mayor Robert Wagner in 1953. The first of many
such projects, its construction was an early tremor
in the subsequent collapse of property values,
white flight, and economic decline which sent the
neighborhood into a tailspin (Gonzalez, 2004).
THE SOUTH BRONX AND THE NEOLIBERAL TURN
Although it was not evident at the time, the
progressive ambition that characterized the era of
the New Deal and accompanying urban renewal
was coming to an end - both for New York and
across the capitalist world - just as the 1975
Charter Revision came into effect. New York City’s
fiscal crisis led to the creation of the Emergency
Financial Control Board, which laid off 20% of City
employees, hiked transit fares, and initiated a
program of austerity that left the South Bronx
disproportionately vulnerable to the fires,
unemployment and hunger that characterized its
nadir (McClelland and Magdovitz, 2000). During
the preceding period of big government the South
Bronx had been burdened with highways and
urban renewal. Now, in the rubble of the South
Bronx, on the site of the worst excesses of the
implicit social hierarchy of progressive politics
Ronald Reagan himself shouted to a pleading
crowd of residents that “There is no program or
promise that a president can make […] that the
federal government can wave a wand and [fix] this”
(Altimeter Films, 2020). The state had failed the
communities of the South Bronx - but by the 1980s
it was clear it would not lift a finger to make them
whole.
Figure 1. Bronx Community Districts.
Since that time both the federal and local
government have been characterized as
prioritizing economic development to the
exclusion of considerations such as health, equity
or justice: economic geographer David Harvey
calls this modus operandi the neoliberal state, or,
“a state apparatus whose fundamental mission [is]
to facilitate conditions for profitable capital
accumulation” (Harvey, 2007:7). The current of
neoliberal capitalism flows through many planning
decisions in the South Bronx, and is an important
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context for understanding the motivations of
decision makers in the case study section.
Despite significant steps towards recovery since
the 1980s, the four CBs comprising the South
Bronx experience poverty rates around 35%,
double the citywide figure (Furman Center, 2018).
Demographically, its neighborhoods are primarily
Black and Latinx (Ibid.). While the South Bronx
faces a complex nexus of issues stemming largely
from its high poverty rate, it stands out notably for
its rates of respiratory disease, including
childhood asthma: 485 hospitalizations per 10,000
children across all four CBs (Hinterland et al.,
2018). This health outcome is widely attributed to
the prevalence of highways crossing the South
Bronx, such as the Bruckner Expressway and
Cross Bronx, as well as the industrial uses along
the waterfront such as four (4) peaker power
plants, a waste transfer station, and several
distribution centers (Spira-Cohen et al., 2011;
Storck, 2016; Kazis, 2010). The peninsular
neighborhood of Hunt’s Point in the Southeastern
Bronx and the stretch of riverbank along Bronx Kill
known as Port Morris comprise the industrial
waterfront of the borough. The Hunts Point
Terminal Produce Cooperative, a FedEx shipping
center, a printing center for the New York Post, and
multiple beverage distributors have all made their
home there. These uses have been the subject of
scrutiny among local environmental justice
advocates, a pressure counterbalanced by the heft
of economic influence wielded by these
corporations. Straddling this tension between the
will of a community ravaged by pollution and the
neoliberal drive to lubricate the machinations of
the free market sits the public participation
process discussed in the previous chapter.
The following case studies demonstrate the flaws
in the participatory planning provisions of the New
York City Charter, building off of the work of other
academics from the 1980s and 90s. While some
of their conclusions regarding the efficacy of
Community Boards continue to apply 30 years
later, I apply Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of
participation as an analytical framework for each
case. I also map the exodus by adversarial parties
from the regular order of the planning process
inscribed by the CBs or city agencies as each party
attempts to move the theater of debate to more
favorable ground.
While both cases center environmental justice, one
places the community on a reactive footing
against the state planning apparatus, whereas the
other features the community proactively pursuing
their own plan to address the air pollution endemic
to the area. This enables comparisons between
the proactive and reactive features of the planning
process enshrined in the 1975 Charter Revision.
SUMMARY OF THE FRESHDIRECT DEAL
On February 7, 2012 a press release titled
“Governor Cuomo, Mayor Bloomberg And Borough
President Diaz Announce Freshdirect To Open
New Headquarters In The Bronx Creating Nearly
1,000 New Jobs” was published on the governor’s
website (New York State Governor’s Press Office,
2012). The announcement followed chatter in the
press that the grocery delivery service had been
planning to move its headquarters from Long
Island City, and was the latest move in an ongoing
competition between New York State (NYS) and
New Jersey to woo all manner of corporate
headquarters (Bagli, 2012). Ultimately the NYS
offer proved more attractive, with $120 million in
combined incentives from the state, city and
borough, including $74 million in City sales tax
exemptions, mortgage tax deferrals, and real
estate tax exemptions (New York State Governor’s
Press Office, 2012). The warehouse broke ground
in December 2014 and began operations in 2018
(Small, 2014).
IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE DEAL
The FreshDirect deal is a classic example of
Harvey’s (1989) concept of entrepreneurial city
governance. Embedded in the incentives package
one finds “a whole complex of forces mobilized by
diverse social agents” (p. 7) engaged in inter-urban
competition that is “forc[ing] repetitive and serial
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reproduction of certain patterns of development”
(p. 10) in the form of the South Bronx’ industrial
waterfront. Further supporting the suitability of
this framework, the site offered to FreshDirect was
part of a greenway and riverfront development
plan, a high priority for the waterfront
neighborhood of Mott Haven (NYS Dept. of
Environmental Conservation, 2016), a choice
Harvey associates with a form of development
focused so much on one site that it leads to urban
planning becoming less comprehensive and more
fragmentary (Harvey, 1989).
While Harvey does not discuss the validity of the
reasoning underlying incentives packages like the
one offered to FreshDirect, journalists questioned
the authenticity of FreshDirect’s threat to decamp
the state where most of its customers reside, and
groups like Good Jobs New York expressed
skepticism that the program would actually create
jobs (Bagli, 2012). Their concern tracks with
findings that seventy-five percent (75%) of the
incentives proffered by governments were not the
deciding factor during relocation. Moreover, he
finds that even when successful, the costs of the
incentives outweigh the benefits (Bartik, 2019).
GENESIS OF THE DEAL
Having established the ideological framework that
was the impetus of the project, I now turn to
details of the deal itself: how FreshDirect lobbied
for it, defended it from opposition, and what its
strategy indicates about the political calculus of
the parties involved.
The details of how the incentives package was
developed are largely unavailable to the public, but
reporting indicates that around the time of the
deal, FreshDirect hired three (3) consulting firms,
the personnel of which offer glimpses into the
firm’s strategy and observance of procedure. In
addition to the company’s lobbying group on
retainer, Parkside Group, FreshDirect also
employed a law and lobbying firm to help
negotiate the necessary zoning changes for the
distribution center, as well as a communications
firm known as Marathon Strategies, which
provided spokespeople for the firm (Mott Haven
Herald, 2014). One of these spokespeople had
previous experience on Governor Cuomo’s 2010
campaign, while the other had worked less than a
year ago “as a spokesman for the Economic
Development Corporation, where he provided his
agency’s defense of the FreshDirect deal” (Ibid.).
The fact that an employee of the state could be
hired, albeit indirectly, by the firm which stood to
directly benefit from his public service work is
particularly egregious.
Furthermore, FreshDirect went so far as to hire
Majora Carter, a prominent South Bronx
environmentalist to combat “misinformation” from
opponents of the project (Mott Haven Herald,
2012). The firm used her credibility to, among
other things, argue that a 20 year old
environmental impact study (which had been
completed at a time when rail transportation rather
than delivery trucks had been the expected mode
by which goods would be delivered to the facility)
was accurate enough for some of its assumptions
to carry over into a more timely EIS (Ibid.; AKRF
Inc., 2011).4
On the part of the government, the project
originated under Mayor Bloomberg but was
effectuated during the DeBlasio administration. By
the twilight of the Bloomberg administration it had
developed a reputation of trepidation for corporate
welfare, often attaching riders requiring that
businesses return subsidies if the jobs they
promised failed to materialize (Bagli, 2012). As
then-candidate DeBlasio was making his
opposition to the FreshDirect expansion a
campaign issue, Bloomberg was supporting it with
uncharacteristic abandon alongside Governor
Cuomo and Bronx Borough President Ruben Diaz
Jr. No such rider was present in the contract
between the Industrial Development Authority
4 Notably, the organization Mrs. Carter founded, Sustainable
South Bronx, announced their opposition to the project
proceeding without a new Environmental Impact Study (Mott
Haven Herald, 2013).
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(IDA) and FreshDirect, and while the Bronx
Borough President had released a memorandum
of understanding with FreshDirect requesting a
third of the new jobs be awarded to Bronx
residents, this too was unenforceable (Powell,
2012.). This shift in attitude regarding corporate
incentives from the Bloomberg administration
deserves investigation.
In terms of political economy, Batrik (2019)
explains this alignment of support across multiple
levels of government in his research which found
that once one level of government engages in an
economic incentives program, others are quick to
contribute their own incentives, since the sum
total benefits of attracting new jobs can plausibly
be attributed to each. Even if benefits don’t
materialize, or if they materialize well after the
politician responsible is out of office, voters still
tend to reward the practice at the time of the deal.
The political incentives for pursuing corporate
giveaways are strong despite their weakness as a
policy. In the case of FreshDirect, the combined
city, state and borough governments were paying
approximately $130,000 per $20,000 salary job
(Powell, 2012). While the political economic
justifications described in Batrik (2019) may have
applied to the FreshDirect deal, they are
insufficient to explain why the Bloomberg
administration deviated from the pattern of earlier
deals they had negotiated more adroitly. A more
convincing factor is the unique employment
history of the lobbying personnel hired by
FreshDirect helped twist the Bloomberg
administration into a different posture. Suffice it to
say that the Bloomberg administration’s abrupt
shift in stance on these kinds of packages raised
the suspicion of the deal’s opponents.
While candidate DeBlasio decried the
Bloomberg-era subsidies (Durkin and Fermino,
2013), as Mayor he proved to be more flexible: in
March 2014, leaked emails revealed an informal
agreement between Deputy Mayor Alicia Glen and
FreshDirect’s CEO that the Mayor would drop his
opposition if the company agreed to pay “a living
wage,” a promise which eventually materialized as
a 20% wage increase for unionized workers
(Briquelet, 2014). It should be noted that
FreshDirect was given an exemption from a 2012
law requiring projects receiving over $1,000,000 in
City support to pay a living wage to their
employees, effectively handing FreshDirect a
bargaining chip that they later cashed in for
DeBlasio’s reneger on his promise to withdraw the
subsidies (Trangle, 2015).
An additional batch of leaked emails, this time
between a FreshDirect executive hired around the
time of the deal and his former boss at the
Department of Parks and Recreation, revealed a
breach of the City Charter’s conflict of interest law
(Trangle, 2016). While the email exchange
concerning a small sponsorship deal unrelated to
the FreshDirect relocation was ultimately
inconsequential, it serves to illustrate a prevailing
culture at both institutions that does not take the
appearance of corruption, very seriously. This
conclusion is only enhanced by the political
background of FreshDirect’s lobbyists and the
backroom dealing with the DeBlasio
administration. Given that one of the primary goals
of the 1975 reform was to diminish the
appearance of corruption in planning matters, this
introduction to the FreshDirect deal indicates a
failure of the charter on that score (Goodman et
al., 1973).
CB1 AS A SITE OF CONFLICT
The first public notice concerning the deal came in
the form of a press release on February 7, 2012.
Two days later, the first hearing on the subsidies
gathered outraged comments from residents in
downtown Manhattan (Wall, 2012). A preliminary
vote by the IDA proceeded on February 14 despite
a request by City Councilwoman Melissa
Mark-Viverito (representing Concourse, Concourse
Village, East Harlem, Highbridge, Longwood, Mott
Haven, Port Morris, and Randall's Island) that it be
delayed (Mark-Viverito, 2012). The project quickly
consumed Bronx Community Board 1 (CB1) and
took hold as a recurring and fractious topic.
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Mychal Johnson, a member of CB1 who vocally
opposed the project and organized a coalition of
community groups known as South Bronx Unite
(SBU) in opposition to it was not reappointed to
the Board by Borough President Ruben Diaz Jr, a
move which was widely interpreted as retaliation
for his stance (Johnson, 2021). Following the
notice of Johnson’s removal from the board, a
meeting on July 10, 2013 deciding whether CB1
would approve a modification of the agreement
between the state DOT and the previous
leaseholder concerning the use of the intended
site resulted in a vote of approval, although it was
taken under duress: the copies of the agreement
provided to the CB members were illegible and
incomplete, one board member filibustered the
vote, and the president of the Bronx Overall
Economic Development Corporation is quoted as
saying “We’re not even sure what they voted on,”
following the meeting (Hirsch, 2013). Despite the
confusion on this point, the CPC and Mayor
Bloomberg approved the plan in August (Mott
Haven Herald, 2013). The lack of clarity regarding
the legitimacy of the vote appears to be part of a
larger pattern of obfuscation at the CB. A letter
from the editor of the Mott Haven Herald alleges
that “District Manager Cedric Loftin tried to
prevent the board from debating a resolution that
complained of the lack of community
consultation” around FreshDirect a year earlier, as
well as that Board Chair George Rodriguez had
ended a meeting early to prevent a vote which
would have signaled opposition to the project at a
June 27 meeting (Mott Haven Herald, 2013).
Over the course of 2013 it appears that CB1 was a
continual site of contention over the project, to the
extent that those in charge performed procedural
tricks to prevent dissent from being officially
recorded, even going so far as to remove a
dissident board member (Wall, 2013).5 The
rancour of this conflict belies the CB’s completely
advisory role in the process, and betrays an
5 The only other time a CB member was not reappointed over
their opposition to a project in the Bronx was over Yankee
Stadium’s construction in 2006.
earnest belief among both the CB members and
meeting attendees in the significance of the
process - a critical observation which I will return
to in chapter 4. A year and a half after the project
was announced, opponents of the project had few
official avenues through which to voice their
dissatisfaction.
Outside of the CB, an opportunity for opponents of
the project to voice their concerns arose when an
additional $10,000,000 subsidy from Empire State
Development (ESD) generated a new round of
public hearings in 2014 (Jacobs, 2015). Having
had the benefit of several years of organizing
rather than the two-day notice that had previously
been given to the community ahead of the
February 9, 2012 hearing, opponents of the deal
successfully forced a delay on the vote which
would award the subsidies (Walshe, 2015).
However, at the follow-up meeting several months
later, the board of ESD unanimously approved the
subsidies, at one point stating that the origins of
the high prevalence of childhood asthma in the
South Bronx “are not well understood” (Empire
State Development, 2015:44).6
ACTIVIST RESPONSES
As proponents of the project suppressed dissent
through procedural means, activists also deviated
from the regular participatory planning process in
several ways. In 2015 Mayor DeBlasio was
confronted by opponents of the project while
dining in Mott Haven, and a meeting between
Mychal Johnson’s coalition of environmental
justice groups known as South Bronx Unite (SBU)
resulted. Mayor DeBlasio and then City Council
Speaker Mark-Viverito both attended, but no
substantive change came from the meeting
(Goldenberg, 2015; Johnson, 2021).
South Bronx Unite brought a lawsuit against the
City with three main contentions: that “New York
6 In a study of air pollution in the South Bronx, Maciejczyk et al.
(2004) found that “local environmental factors make a
significant contribution to the pathogenesis and exacerbation
of asthma” (p. 5284)
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City officials [had] systematically understat[ed] the
traffic problems and other impacts on the
neighborhood” (Hu, 2013); that the project violated
the original lease agreement mentioned on page
14; and that the project was ineligible for portions
of the subsidy package it had been granted (Wall,
2013). A Bronx Supreme Court judge threw out the
lawsuit, stating that the City’s EIS had been
sufficient and dismissing the other claims due to
“procedural infirmities” (Ibid.). Concerning the
dispute over the validity of the EIS, the court found
“that the determination of IDA not to require a
Supplemental Environmental Impact Study (SEIS)
was not affected by an error of law, arbitrary and
capricious, or an abuse of discretion”
(Brigantti-Hughes, 2013).
Finally, the group employed a strategy of direct
action, staging a protest at the groundbreaking
ceremony which resulted in nine (9) arrests
including Mychal Johnson, the former member of
CB1 (Scott, 2014). As the group pivoted to other
strategies such as boycotting the company, the
distribution center began operations in 2018
(Dawson, 2018).
IMPACT ON AIR QUALITY
The goal of the opponents to FreshDirect’s
relocation was to limit and ultimately reverse the
introduction of additional pollutants into the air of
a community with an asthma hospitalization rate
five (5) times the national average (South Bronx
Unite, n.d.). In conjunction with the organization,
Shearston et al. (2020) modeled the change in
pollution, noise, and traffic before and after the
distribution center opened using an array of
sensors. They found significant increases in
traffic-related noise as well as a slight increase in
black carbon which “were not adequately
predicted by the facility’s environmental
assessment prior to construction” (p. 16). While
the effect was small, it confirms that the air quality
in the South Bronx is worse than before the move.
POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS
It was for this price that the city, state and borough
secured FreshDirect’s continued participation in
the New York City tax base. I have been unable to
find evidence that this saga had any effect on the
electoral fortunes of any party involved.
Councilwoman Mark-Vivereto was elected Speaker
in 2014, after the most important decisions
concerning the project had been made (Grynbaum,
2014). However, as a councilmember ostensibly
supporting the project’s opponents, she was in a
position to maintain Mychal Johnson’s position on
the board by recommending his appointment after
his removal in 2013 - but evidently declined to pick
that fight with the borough president. Reporting
indicates that she was handpicked by
newly-elected mayor DeBlasio, another supposed
opponent of the project - but she and DeBlasio
were seen at the time as politically aligned and
representing a shift to the left for city government
(Ibid.). Perhaps she tempered her opposition to
FreshDirect to help business interests swallow the
liberal pill she and DeBlasio represented. Mr.
Johnson himself speculates that the reason she
declined to re-nominate him was more social than
political, ascribing it to an attempt to curry favor
with the Bronx political machine whose
established members never accepted her
(Johnson, 2021). At any rate, neither DeBlasio nor
Mark-Viverito seem to have thrown their
considerable political weight against the project,
despite signaling their distaste for it.
Moving on from elected officials, the FreshDirect
fight appears to have had no effect on the power
structure of CB1. Cedric Loftin remains District
Manager of CB1, and chairperson George
Rodriguez passed away in office in 2019. This is
unsurprising since both men serve or served at the
pleasure of the borough president, a strong
supporter of the project. What is notable about
CB1’s role in the project is not the lack of political
consequences, however, but the vigor with which
adversaries contested the project on its terrain.
Despite the board having no effective power to
prevent the deal, board leadership resorted to
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tactics that betray an earnest belief in the
significance of CB1’s advisory role.
ANALYSIS
In contrast to the district manager and chairperson
of CB1, South Bronx Unite recognized that by
joining the conflict over FreshDirect on the
discursive battlefield of CB1, they were only
contributing to its false legitimacy as a democratic
institution representative of the community. By
abandoning the CB as a site of conflict, they not
only found more favorable terrain from which to
contest the deal, they dealt a critical blow to the
legitimacy of the CB and thus the cooptative
apparatus.
In this sense, the attempts to silence the CB’s
dissenting voices backfired spectacularly: rather
than admitting defeat and shrinking from the
public eye, SBU was able to pivot from agitating
within the CB against FreshDirect to publicizing
CB1’s suppression of their concerns. What might
have remained a footnote in New York’s
development became a subject of political
scrutiny.
Arnstein (1969) theorized a “ladder of citizen
participation” that characterizes different degrees
of participation by the level of power afforded to
participants (Fig. 2).
The role of a CB in a generic project is that of
informing and consultation - CBs are a point of
contact by which the city informs the community
of upcoming changes and solicits nonbinding
input from community members on said changes.
In the case of FreshDirect we see a CB operating
at even less satisfactory levels of participation
than this - abandoning even the semblance of
democracy to silence opposition. It is notable that
even the lowest rung on Arnstein’s ladder
signifying “the distortion of participation into a
public relations vehicle by powerholders” (p. 26) is
insufficient to describe CB1 during the FreshDirect
fight. The Borough President, District Manager and
Chairperson found the expression of resistance to
FreshDirect so threatening as to risk jeopardizing
the legitimacy of the board, eliminating even its
value as a PR vehicle. Credit for this belongs to
those who organized to publicize and sustain the
conflict, forcing those in power to engage in such
procedural hardball that they unwittingly
undermined the veneer of legitimacy around the
planning process. In the final analysis, South Bronx
Unite prevented the voice of their community from
being tidily co-opted by the state planning
apparatus in support of a neoliberal agenda that
furthered their exploitation - but the undemocratic
institutional landscape of the Community Board
system prevented the community from clinching a
more substantive victory.
Figure 2. Ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1969).
The FreshDirect deal showcases the tools at the
disposal of Community Boards when they want to
silence dissent, as well as the options available to
communities reacting to plans they disapprove of.
I now turn towards a project initiated by a South
Bronx community that involved more meaningful
participation - although it too fell short of true
citizen power.
HISTORY OF THE SHERIDAN EXPRESSWAY
The Sheridan Expressway was originally conceived
by Robert Moses as an artery alleviating
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congestion on the Major Deegan to which it would
run parallel, as part of his second wave of highway
building projects initiated in 1954 (Caro, 1974).
Belief in this strategy of traffic relief was
widespread but declining at the time, as previous
expansions had failed to produce the desired
effect - a traffic pattern which we now describe as
induced demand (Ibid.; EPA, 2002). Moses’ original
plan for the highway was to connect it to I-95, but
public opposition for the requisite destruction of
the Bronx Zoo halted the project, which ceased
construction in 1964 leaving a 1.25 mile stub of
asphalt along the Bronx River (Topousis, 2000). By
the turn of the millennium the highway had
garnered a reputation for disuse and had been
identified as an opportunity for improvement
(Ibid.).
GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT
As I turn to the proposals themselves, it is
important to identify the geographic features of
the South Bronx around which this project
revolves. In terms of rail, the study area contains
the elevated 6 line which runs along the Sheridan’s
southern portion before crossing the Bronx River,
as well as Metro North and CSX tracks which
cross at a similar location. For interstate highways,
the Bruckner, Major Deegan and Cross Bronx all
contribute to traffic flowing in and out of the
borough (Fig. 3). A notable component of this
traffic is trucks travelling to and from the Hunts
Point Food Distribution Center (HPFDC), which
employed 3,500 people in 2017 (McGeehan, 2017).
In terms of land use, the area is characterized by
residential and industrial development, with
industrial uses most commonly sited in Hunts
Point or along the Bronx River. The overlapping
nature of the 6 stations and expressway exists
along the elevated Bruckner creates dangerous
pedestrian conditions, while off- and on-ramps
form impenetrable barriers to non-motorized
travel. Finally, the ground-level Sheridan
Expressway itself cuts off access to Concrete
Plant Park and Starlight Park along the river.
Conflicts between competing industrial, residential
and transportation uses are endemic to the study
area, and trade-offs between these uses
characterize the different proposals for the
Sheridan.
Figure 3. Study Area (NYCDOT et al., 2013:9).
SUMMARY OF THE PROJECT’S TIMELINE
A community plan to decommission State Route
895 and develop the land as park and residential
space was put forth in 2006 by a collection of
community organizations known as the Southern
Bronx River Watershed Alliance (SBRWA) (SBRWA,
2015). The proposal was for the redevelopment of
the 28 acres of land containing the expressway,
which saw such little traffic that one could safely
stand in the middle of it at rush hour, into
affordable housing and commercial space, with
the end goal of reconnecting the neighborhoods of
CB 3 with the Bronx River waterfront (Bin Jung,
2009). To account for the truck traffic that would
be diverted onto local streets in such a scenario,
the plan also included a ramp from the Bruckner
directly into the Hunts Point Food Distribution
Center, making it a more efficient truck route than
the Cross Bronx and eliminating the need for the
Sheridan to connect the Cross Bronx to Hunts
Point (SBRWA, 2008). The New York State
Department of Transportation (NYSDOT) initially
appeared to heed the demands of the Alliance for
a holistic impact analysis of the plan which would
include considerations beyond transportation, but
as the project developed it deviated from the
communities’ vision. A 2010 traffic analysis
conducted by the agency seemed “engineered to
reach [the] preconceived result” that eliminating
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the highway would flood local streets with traffic
(Kazis, 2010), and a subsequent, more promising
Transportation Investment Generating Economic
Recovery (TIGER) grant funded study conducted
by the city nevertheless reached the same
conclusion. With the removal of the highway off
the table, residents selected the NYCDOT design
option that was second-closest to their vision: one
that would maximally reduce the right-of-way of
the highway and add protected intersections at
three points along its length, bringing the scale
and feel of the Sheridan more in line with other
local streets (Arzu, 2017) (Fig. 4). The city plan
also called for a truck-dedicated exit ramp off the
Bruckner Expressway to be built in southwest
Hunt’s Point, to avoid further isolating the
neighborhood from the Bronx River waterfront.
In March of 2017, four years after the residents
selected this plan, NYSDOT unveiled their final plan
for the highway in a press release featuring the
approval of Governor Andrew Cuomo, Bronx
Borough President Ruben Diaz Jr., and local State
Assemblyman Marcos Crespo (NYS Governor’s
Press Office, 2017). In the press release, State
Senator Jeff Klein went so far as to acknowledge
"the destructive consequences of decisions that
ignored the needs of our communities” which were
allegedly rectified by the Sheridan redesign.
However, the fanfare belied the content of the
final plan. The plan featured the same number of
travel lanes as the existing Expressway, requiring a
pedestrian to cross three different roads to reach
the waterfront. It also placed the Bruckner
off-ramps along the Bronx River, in direct violation
of community expectations (Meyer, 2017). The
expressway, rechristened as a boulevard,
completed its makeover in 2019 (Cuba, 2019).
While the Sheridan Expressway project began with
the residents and environmental justice organizers
of the South Bronx, it did not end with them.
Rather, the vision the community set forth was
gradually eroded over 20 years by a multiplicity of
forces citing economic and technical constraints,
resulting in an outcome largely resembling the
status quo.
Figure 4. City-recommended design option (NYCDOT et al.,
2013:36).
GENEALOGY OF THE SHERIDAN REDESIGN
This project has had a long history with many
details worth considering. In the summary section,
I have attempted to provide an overview of the
project’s development from ideation to
implementation. It is clear that the final product
was not what the community envisioned, and one
may safely infer that a breakdown of the
participatory process is responsible. Despite this
key similarity to the previous case study, several
important differences are also at play. First, the
venue in which this conflict occurred was not
Community Board 3 (which circumscribes the
Sheridan), but rather a series of visioning sessions
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and opportunities for public comment occurring
throughout the project’s timeline.7 It is for this
reason that this section will center these irregular
events rather than routine CB meetings.
Additionally, while the FreshDirect deal became a
political football which attracted considerable
attention in the mainstream press, with political
actors exerting principal authority over the project,
the conflict over the Sheridan redesign may be
found in the competing logics of NYC civil service
professionals represented by DOT, DCP and EDC,
and those of the community, represented by
SBRWA. By analyzing the key public meetings
between these two parties I will show that
SBRWA’s proposals and advocacy flow from a
vision of restorative environmental justice,
whereas those of the civil service professionals
stem from a similar neoliberal ideological
framework to that of the FreshDirect boosters, in
which the economic needs of the Hunts Point
Distribution Center needed to be balanced against
the health and equity needs of the community.
I begin by demonstrating the initial stances of the
belligerents in this case. SBRWA portrayed
decommissioning the Sheridan as a win-win for
both the community and the distribution center in
the original 2006 Community Plan, touting “safe
and efficient truck access” in addition to the
immediate concerns of the community, indicating
a ‘big tent’ style approach in keeping with the
group’s coalitional nature (Southern Bronx River
Watershed Alliance, 2008). In contrast, a leader of
the Hunts Point Terminal Produce Cooperative
Association expressed a significantly more myopic
conception of the community:
Eliminating the Sheridan would bring things
backwards a bit and make it worse. The job is
to try and fix the situation, not to make a park.
This is about highway stuff and traffic […] a
7 Effectuation of community goals outside the CBs has a
substantial history: opposition to the Lower Manhattan
Expressway (1967) and the Melrose Commons Community
Plan (1994) are both notable successes of this approach
(Amato, 2018).
few minutes of truckers’ time on a bad day will
stifle the entire community (Dolnick, 2010).
The attitude of the Hunts Point business
community characterized by this quote not only
assumes a zero-sum result, but indicates a
normative entitlement to the full assistance of the
state in support of private enterprise. To the extent
that the larger community is a consideration, its
needs are substituted for the needs of the delivery
drivers. Both the organizations comprising SBRWA
and the HPFDC have long histories of interaction
with government, but it is clear that these
institutions have learned very different lessons
from those encounters.
An early meeting between NYSDOT and the public
on July 13, 2010 is notable to introduce a recurring
debate over the heuristics that the agency was
using to analyze the different proposals. DOT
presented two proposals, each with a new ramp
connecting the Bruckner to Hunts Point, but one
that left the Sheridan in place and another that
decommissioned the expressway (Kazis, 2010).
Through the course of the meeting and during Q&A
it became clear that DOT was not factoring what
would replace the highway as they began their
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) - essentially
comparing the two only in terms of their impact on
surface transportation, a framework which would
make the decommission option much less
attractive, to the dismay of activists. A year later,
however, NYCDOT and DCP began taking more
responsibility for the project with the advent of a
$1.5 million TIGER-funded study that would
include more holistic metrics than the aborted
NYS EIS would have (Kazis, 2011) (Fig. 5).
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Figure 5. New Study Area (NYC DCP, 2011).
The city began work on the project in July 2011
with walking tours, charrettes and other forms of
public engagement, during which the project
appeared to move in a promising direction for
SBRWA (Ibid.). At the same time, negotiations
between the Bloomberg administration and
HPFDC over their lease had begun, with counter
offers from New Jersey putting pressure on city
officials to produce a favorable deal (Crain’s New
York, 2012). The two parties extended the
negotiation deadline by 90 days in late February
2012, indicating contention (Ibid). At the
conclusion of this period, HPFDC was awarded
“$50 million in state funding and $87.5 million in
both capital funding and tax incentives from New
York City” (Governor’s Press Office, 2012) in a
move reminiscent of FreshDirect’s $120 million
incentives package.
Then, at a May 10, 2012 meeting DCP announced
that as a result of their own traffic study they
would no longer be considering any options that
would remove the Sheridan, blindsiding
community members (Fried, 2012). NYCDOT made
the determination that “trucks heading from the
Cross Bronx to Hunts Point would have to use
other local streets” (Miller, 2012), an option that
ignored several factors that had previously been
brought to DOT’s attention, such as the ability for
delivery trucks to use the lower level of the George
Washington Bridge, prohibited since the
September 11 attacks but possible in theory, to
access the Bruckner and avoid the Sheridan
altogether (Ibid.). From there, ramps connecting
the Bruckner to Hunts Point that were meant to
offset the Sheridan’s lost capacity would now
complement the Sheridan route. Reporters were
unable to confirm a connection between the recent
deal and the narrowing of the methodology of
DCP’s analysis.
Figure 6. The final Sheridan Boulevard section.
In the previous case I demonstrated a propensity
within the Bloomberg administration for overriding
community plans such as the South Bronx
Waterfront Development plan in favor of economic
development priorities. The FreshDirect deal was
announced on February 7, 2012, weeks before the
negotiation window between the city and HPFDC
was to expire (Governor’s Press Office, 2012). In
light of the remarks by the HPFDC representative
quoted on page 20, it is clear that leadership of
that organization understood the role of the state
in keeping with the kind of support offered to
FreshDirect. It is possible that representatives of
the distribution center were aware of the deal
being offered to FreshDirect and, recognizing that
it strengthened their bargaining position with the
city, agreed to a 90 day extension and proceeded
to extract concessions up to and including the
retention of the Sheridan. However, this theory is
uncorroborated, and one source I spoke with noted
that most parties involved with the project
believed it “was a pipe dream at the time,” and that
therefore the loss of freight capacity envisaged in
the Sheridan plan was likely not treated as a
credible threat by HPFDC (Genn, 2021).
Regardless, the fact remains that HPFDC, like
FreshDirect, used interstate competition to extract
concessions from state coffers.
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Figure 7. The community-favored Oak Point ramps and the
state-favored Edgewater ramps (SBRWA, 2018).
Following the changes wrought by the May 2012
meeting, the trajectory of the project was largely
unperturbed. Reporting from December 2012
indicates members of SBRWA readjusting their
ambitions for the project (Miller, 2012). A 2013
plan for the Sheridan asked residents to cross five
(5) lanes of traffic to reach the Bronx River Park,
which was later revised to eleven (11) lanes in
2017 (Trangle, 2018) (Fig. 6). With respect to the
Bruckner ramps, DOT selected an option
disfavored by the community because it would
direct traffic through a residential area on its way
to Hunts Point as well as become an additional
barrier to the community’s tenuous connection to
the waterfront (Cuba, 2019). The community’s
preferred option would have required bridging a
CSX train yard, which DOT claimed to be too
expensive (Meyer, 2017) (Fig. 7). However, DOT’s
preferred option required the use of eminent
domain for several lots, displacing businesses in
order to avoid negotiating with the freight
company (Meyer, 2018). This decision was made
after only one community meeting, which had only
been announced just a week prior (Meyer, 2017).
In June 2018 NYSDOT released a draft EIS on the
project, which found that the ramps would lead to
a net increase in air pollution at the foot of
residential buildings (USDOT et al., 2018). After 20
years of advocacy and $1.7 billion in capital costs,
the Sheridan Boulevard was unchanged except for
the addition of three (3) crosswalks connecting
the residential community to the Bronx River.
Despite this result, activists responsible for
shepherding the 20-year process acknowledge
that “It's not what we wanted, but outside of that
the plan is great stuff,” emphasizing that absent
the commitment of State funding the Sheridan
would have remained completely impenetrable
and truck traffic to HPFDC would have continued
to spill onto local streets, a problem both SBRWA
and the distribution center sought to address - but
also admitting that by the end of the process,
fatigue had claimed much of the ambition that
characterized the group’s earlier proposals
(Shuffler, 2021).
ANALYSIS
Finding themselves in a community plagued with
high asthma rates, ringed by highways and cut off
from natural environments, SBRWA developed a
plan for the Sheridan expressway that countered
the NYSDOT plan to widen the highway in the late
90s (SBRWA, 2015). Their plan considered a
radical and comprehensive alternative, with
transportation, housing, sustainability, and
economic development planks. Over the next two
decades their vision was chipped away under the
banners of technical difficulty, of high expense,
and of contribution to congestion. The project as
implemented did not improve access to the
waterfront so much as it redistributed it, falling far
short of community goals. In contrast to the
FreshDirect case, this project followed regular
procedure, and once receiving the TIGER grant (in
no small part a fruit of the group’s labor) likely
achieved a higher level of participation than other
projects of similar scale.8 However, while the
planners and transportation engineers were
required to attend the meetings, the modes of
analysis they applied and the value judgments they
8 According to the NYCDOT website, at least 12 meetings
between 2011 and 2013 were conducted concerning the
Sheridan (not including public site tours)
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made were discretionary. It is at this elective
junction that the degree and kind of participation
was truly determined. At its most promising, the
Sheridan project saw the SBRWA collaborating
with DCP to win a TIGER grant. At its worst, the
neoliberal logic of professional planners and traffic
engineers, in weighing the efficient transportation
of a fraction of trucks driving into and out of Hunts
Point (Fig. 8) more heavily than the desire of South
Bronx residents to have an accessible waterfront,
superseded the needs of the community as
portrayed in the original 2006 plan.
Figure 8. Analysis of truck routes (NYC DOT, 2013).
Returning to Arnstein’s (1969) framework, the
Sheridan project runs the gamut from partnership,
the sixth rung of the ladder, to consultation, the
fourth. If the project maintained its community
driven quality throughout its life, it might have
earned higher marks, but “when powerholders
restrict the input of citizens’ ideas solely to
[consultation], participation remains just a
window-dressing ritual” (Ibid.: 28). The community
was thoroughly consulted - but as the piecemeal
revelations from city and state officials brought
the project’s final shape into focus, leaders came
to realize that their input had still been ignored.
The Southern Bronx River Watershed Alliance had
developed a comprehensive plan which included
housing, retail, transportation and environmental
planks. This project, and the years of advocacy
work that went into its promotion, represent an
enormous investment by the community in its
future. Yet, when the governor’s office released a
high-quality video touting the project, their role
was erased - instead the narrative begins with
Robert Moses’ role in building the expressway
before announcing that “in 2017, Governor Cuomo
took action” as inspiring music swells in the
background (Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, 2019).
No community members are featured in the video,
but the president of one of the food distributors
happily “applaud[s] the Governor for taking the
time to say ‘somebody’s gotta step up and bring
this to a resolution’” (Ibid.). One city official I spoke
with noted that the video reminded him of “other
Cuomo projects, like the Tappan Zee,” observing
this kind of self-aggrandizement is part and parcel
with the Governor’s self image as a leader who
builds things, contrasting himself with the flaccid
leadership that preceded him (Genn, 2021). The
ability for viewers of the video to post comments
is disabled.
Figure 9. Before and after comparison (Governor Andrew M.
Cuomo, 2019).
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04: INSTRUMENTALIZED
PARTICIPATION AND THE
LAUNDERING OF STATE POWER
Both the FreshDirect deal and the Sheridan
redesign were touted in press releases as victories
for the underserved communities of the South
Bronx, each featuring numerous elected officials
offering praise and support for the projects (NYS
Governor’s Press Office, 2017; NYS Governor’s
Press Office, 2012). In this sense, elected officials
co-opted activist labor by taking credit for
improving the South Bronx despite substantial
opposition (as in the FreshDirect case) or despite
having themselves tolerated the deviation of the
project from the community’s vision (as with the
Sheridan). This form of co-optation is insidious,
but it fails to capture the full array of stakeholders
engaged in the co-optative project. To fully
understand it, I will develop a theory which
instrumentalizes participation as a laundering
agent in the devolution of state power not to the
community as the Goodman Commission
intended, but to private interests.
The members of the Goodman commission faced
a difficult challenge when they rewrote the NYC
Charter’s planning functions. The main balancing
act they were tasked with was assessing the
degree to which the city could still function as a
whole while decentralizing planning power as
much as possible. Their answer to this challenge
was to devolve some planning power to borough
level offices, and to set the level of participation at
the community boards between informing and
consultation, to return to Arnstein’s (1969) ladder.
In terms of concrete power, planning had been
decentralized to the degree that borough
presidents could exercise aldermanic privilege on
the board of estimate and city councilmembers
could exercise the same in council sessions. But
the community boards, as well as the public
hearings required as part of ULURP and CEQR, did
not meaningfully bind planning officials. They
offered citizens the opportunity to consult or be
informed regarding planning decisions, but in
concrete terms no power had been delegated to
the CB level. In part due to the fiscal crisis of 1975
which drew attention away from the results of
reform, and in part because of the uncritical
planning scholarship around the CBs in the early
Postreform years, this default mode of public
consultation became accepted as an important
function of democratic city governance, despite
their straightforwardly undemocratic structure.
The Goodman Commission's choice to fill CB
seats by appointment and withhold concrete
power from them would leave these neighborhood
institutions vulnerable to the political, economic
and social transformations to come.
THE LAUNDERING OF STATE POWER
Following the neoliberal turn of the 1970s, this
transformation arrived as city governments shifted
from a stance of managerialism to
entrepreneurialism (Harvey, 1989). The tacit
assumption that the role of government, and the
role of planning in particular, is to facilitate the
exchange of goods and lubricate the cogs of
capitalist accumulation became more entrenched
decade by decade. This neoliberal logic is knit
throughout both the FreshDirect and Sheridan
cases. In the former case, dissenting voices were
suppressed within the community board, enabling
a superficial approval of the development of the
FreshDirect site, thus exploiting its perceived
legitimacy as a democratic representative of the
community in service of an economic
development package. In the latter, participation
and even partnership between citizens and their
government was leveraged to pass off an
expensive infrastructure improvement benefitting
a handful of companies and as a
community-driven project. In both cases, the
priorities of business interests were achieved at
the expense of the air quality and amenity access
of the poorest congressional district in the nation
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010).
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The degree of participation in these cases was
modulated and corralled in pursuit of that goal.
With the ink dry and the ribbon cut, elected
officials and business leaders could point to the
participatory process as a legitimizing factor or a
point of pride during their victory laps. In each
case the performance of democracy enabled state
power to be laundered, by way of community
participation, to the private sector.
DEMOCRACY FOR SOME
In Marc Dunkelman’s 2019 essay on the travails of
Penn Station’s redevelopment, he puts forth the
following thesis:
If the progressive movement’s original project
had been to use centralized authority to
pursue the greater good, in the 1970s the left’s
new mission was to prevent public power from
trampling the powerless [...] In the decades
since, that gospel has been used to justify
efforts to require projects to mitigate even the
slightest environmental effects, to preserve
landmarked buildings no matter the cost, to
democratize land use decisions so that
not-in-my-backyard stakeholders can reject
even projects of great public benefit, and
much more. By many measures, the
movement to devolve power has been wildly
successful. But more than four decades later,
the trade-offs have become more evident.
Nowhere is the evidence starker than at Penn
Station (Dunkelman, 2019).
I would contend that this movement has been
“wildly successful” only for the neighborhoods and
community boards with the resources, wealth and
expertise to bring their will to bear on the civic
stage. For example, the opposition to FreshDirect
could easily be characterized as a
“not-in-my-backyard” effort against a project of
questionable public benefit - and yet it clearly did
not benefit from democratization of any sort. This
stands in contrast to the experience of boards in
more affluent quarters, which often enjoy
favorable relationships with developers which are
averse to even an advisory vote of rejection
(Woodward, 2021).
In fact, such neighborhoods may be the source of
contentious projects that find their way to the
South Bronx: a South Bronx real estate
professional I spoke with identifies a pattern of
NYC development through which formerly
industrial areas of the city gentrify and displace
industrial uses, such as FreshDirect from Long
Island City or the mail distribution centers in Hell’s
Kitchen (Johnson, 2021). In his telling, these uses
then migrate from the backyards of CBs whose




I mentioned above that the FreshDirect deal
constitutes an example of a project of
questionable public benefit. But setting aside the
specific flaws of that project or those of the
Sheridan project, it is conceivable that the
continued good operation of the Hunts Point
Terminal Produce Cooperative and FreshDirect as
secured by these projects could benefit the
residents of the South Bronx in the form of jobs. It
is also conceivable that in time, the taxes paid by
these firms will be spent in ways that benefit the
community. Even under the most favorable
assumptions, these projects would present a
trade-off between economic benefit and the
respiratory health of the community, in addition to
foreclosing on the possibility of a park along the
Port Morris waterfront and affordable housing
along the Bronx River. No doubt some members of
the community, making the same favorable
assumptions, found this trade-off to be
acceptable- certainly many CB1 members
approved of the FreshDirect subsidy. To such
proponents, the members of South Bronx Unite
retort in an oft repeated slogan, “You can’t work if
you can’t breathe” (Rivera, 2014). This
quintessentially Postreform debate was able to
(ostensibly) occur through communicative
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rationality: the neoliberal logic supporting the
combined expenditure of $1.82 billion on HPFDC &
FreshDirect had to compete with the logic that
community health is a necessary antecedent to
job creation (Healey, 1992). However, I have shown
that the reality of the planning process in these
case studies more closely resembles the
unilateralism of the earlier Reform school of
planning, despite proceeding under the
camouflage of democracy.
Healey herself was aware of this critique of
communicative rationality, asking whether it
[does] not merely cocoon us into a naive belief
in the power of democratic discussions, while
the forces of global capitalism ever more
cleverly conceal the ways they oppress us? [...]
to engage in any other strategy is to generate
once again forms of planning which have
inherent within them an anti-democratic
‘dominatory’ potential (Ibid.: 159).
It seems that even the strategy she puts forth,
embodied however imperfectly in New York’s
participatory planning process, contains in itself
the fatal flaw she envisaged in the other forms of
planning thought. The unquestioned allegiance to
rationality understood as “pure logic and scientific
empiricism” (Ibid.:237) which delivered for New
York “the disaster of high-rise towers for the poor
[...] the dominance of economic criteria justifying
road building and the functional categorization of
activity zones, which worked for large industrial
companies and those working in them, but not for
women (with their necessarily complex lifestyles),
the elderly and the disabled, and the many ethnic
groups forced to discover ways of surviving on the
edge of established economic practices”
(Ibid.:235) is reconstituted today in the
unquestioned allegiance to the ‘democracy’ of
participatory planning.
CONCLUSION
In her remarks regarding the Sheridan project,
director of community organizing and outreach at
Youth Ministries for Peace and Justice Dariella
Rodriguez stated that:
Our young people learned about Robert Moses
and his racist city planning, and we actually
celebrated when we heard the governor’s
announcement [that the state would fund the
Sheridan redesign… but] our community voices
and our interests [are] not recognized in these
plans (Meyer, 2018).
If the goal of Postreform governance was “to
prevent public power from trampling the
powerless,” (Dunkelman, 2019) it was
unsuccessful insofar as public power was
devolved not to communities but to private
institutions which, deploying their sway over the
state, trampled the residents of the South Bronx. If
the trade-offs of decentralization end up enabling
the rejection of projects of public benefit as
Dunkelman maintains, and yet the system as
designed also permits outcomes like those found
in the FreshDirect and Sheridan case studies, of
what use was the devolution of power? If the
participatory planning process bestows veto
power on wealthy communities with one hand
while appropriating the labor, clout, and energy of
grassroots organizations with the other, can it
really be said to serve all New Yorkers? Certainly
the continued intonations of ‘democracy’ when
referring to these forms of managed participation
ought to be eliminated, not only for the term’s
inaccuracy but for the cover it offers apparatchiks
and elected officials engaged in the transfiguration
of projects intended to benefit corporations into a
publicly palatable product. For planners to begin to
demystify this simulacrum of democracy, it will
require an acknowledgement that the process is
insufficient to protect vulnerable communities, and
an awareness of the ways it abets their
exploitation. Only then can it be reformed.
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